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ABSTRACT
People sometimes hold opinions on others’ choices, particularly their reproductive
decisions, as these choices are important decisions that impact the lives of multiple
people. People can believe that everyone should have children (pro-natalism) or that
everyone should refrain from having children (anti-natalism) or they can hold no position
on the reproduction of others. The main justification for anti-natalism is that life contains
more suffering than pleasure and that it would be better if new people were not born to
experience this suffering. This is why some theorists argue that people reject antinatalism irrespective of how bad life is because of an optimism bias (Benatar, 2006). I
tested this theory by assessing the effects of optimism on people’s opinions of and
support for anti-natalism. Overall, optimism did not significantly reduce anti-natalism,
though optimism specifically about future children did reduce support for anti-natalism.
Additionally, nostalgia significantly reduced support for anti-natalism.
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CHAPTER I – THE EFFECTS OF OPTIMISM ON ANTI-NATALISM
Choosing to have children is a life-changing decision for both parent and child, it
is also a decision that most people decide to make at some point in their life. While the
birthrate has steadily dropped over the past fifty years around the world (The World
Bank, 2017), this reduced birthrate does not imply that most people refrain from having
children. For example, while voluntary childlessness has greatly increased in the United
States, the majority of the population is continuing to reproduce and women in their 40s
are now less likely to be childless than they were a decade ago (Livingston, 2015).
Around much of the world, people are choosing to have fewer children, but most are
continuing to have some.
What beliefs guide people in the decision to reproduce (or not)? Some research
suggests that people’s beliefs about when they will have children typically closely match
when their parents expect them to have children, suggesting that parental socialization
influences the parenthood decisions of their children (Starrels & Holms, 2000). Other
beliefs have a specifically moral character: It is commonly believed that reproduction is
morally obligatory and, as a result, people who willingly choose to not have children are
seen as less fulfilled in life than people who have chosen to become parents (AshburnNardo, 2017). People also feel more anger and disgust toward voluntarily childless
individuals than they do toward parents, further suggesting that reproduction is seen as a
moral imperative that is reason for condemnation when violated (Ashburn-Nardo, 2017).
Likewise, certain groups hold specific views about their group’s (or sometimes all
of humanity’s) reproductive behaviors. For example, some denominations of Christianity,
such as Catholicism, believe that it is morally wrong for people to actively take steps to
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prevent having children, especially if they are choosing to not have children solely
because they do not want or cannot support a child (Burke & Cohen, 2016). The Roman
Catholic Church continues to stand against the use of contraception, the-morning-afterpill, sterilization, and abortion (Levada, 2008). Additionally, the Roman Catholic Church
sometimes actively works to prevent individuals from forgoing parenthood by forbidding
doctors in Catholic hospitals from offering contraception and performing sterilization.
More broadly, the Catholic church sometimes attempts to influence governmental
policies to restrict the reproductive choices of citizens (Stulberg, Hoffman, Dahlquist, &
Freedman, 2014).
Additionally, some governments have been known to push pro-natalist policies in
order to increase their birthrate. An extreme example of a pro-natalist country is Romania
under the rule of Nicolae Ceausescu. Ceausescu mandated births to increase the country’s
birthrate by forbidding contraception, sterilization, and abortion, restricting the
availability of divorce, taxing unmarried individuals over the age of 25, and instituting
mandated monthly physicals for all working women to check for pregnancy and
investigate any women who were found to be pregnant and did not soon give birth
(Berelson, 1979; David, 1990). Romania’s enforced pro-natalist policies had immediate
success with an extreme increase in births the year after its inception, but after a year
births dropped to near the previous level as people found ways to import contraception
from the black market and obtain illegal abortions. More so, the law did not work to
institute a stable increase in the number of children parents cared for. Immediately after
the law took effect orphanages were overrun by newly abandoned babies, which created
an international orphanage crisis as the children grew older and began experiencing
2

developmental delays from a lack of proper care and affection (David, 1990; The World
Bank, 2017).
More recently, as birthrates have continued to fall, some countries have attempted
to implement less extreme pro-natalist policies. Many countries have attempted to raise
their birthrate by guaranteeing and subsidizing paid parental leave and providing bonuses
and tax credits to people who have children (United Nations, 2017).
This paper attempts to explore the moral foundation of beliefs about reproductive
ethics. The aims of this paper are to 1) introduce the philosophical topic of anti-natalism,
the countervailing view that reproduction is immoral, 2) discuss optimism as it relates to
anti-natalism, 3) discuss nostalgia as a possible contrast to optimism, and 4) report a
study examining the effects of optimism and nostalgia manipulations on individuals’
thoughts about anti-natalism.
1.1 Anti-Natalism
The philosophical view that argues against human reproduction is anti-natalism.
Anti-natalism is the view that it is morally wrong for any person to reproduce. According
to anti-natalist thought, all people should refrain from having children in order to prevent
the potential child from suffering or to prevent the potential child from causing others to
suffer (Benatar, 1997; 2006). In the next sections, I introduce philosophical views on
anti-natalism and discuss their potential for research in psychology.
1.1.1 Historical Background
Though having become popularized in philosophy only recently, the main
historical voice for anti-natalism was 19th-century philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer
(1851). Schopenhauer (1851) thought that life was filled with misery and that humans
3

were not only sentenced to eventual death, but also to all of the many miseries that life
contains. According to Schopenhauer (1851) people typically have children because for
many it is a natural consequence of sex, instead of a rational choice made without any
influence of a person’s libido: If people were thinking completely rationally, free from
any influence of their libido, they would choose to forgo having children in order to
prevent those children from being born, thus being forced to experience all of life’s
suffering.
1.1.2 Contemporary Anti-Natalism
More recently anti-natalism has been popularized by David Benatar (1997; 2006;
2015; 2017). The main justification given by Benatar (1997; 2006) for anti-natalism is the
asymmetry between the good things in life and the bad. Specifically, he argues that
people experience more suffering than pleasure in life. Many people are forced to endure
extremely bad lives that are filled with disease, disability, starvation, and poverty (2006;
2017). And even middle-class individuals who seemingly have good lives must
experience life’s monotony and eventual death. Benatar (2006; 2017) compared the life
of an average person to sort of a hamster on a wheel: In order to be relatively comfortable
in life, people must do a never ending list of things that they might otherwise not want to
do, like cook, clean, bathe, care for parents and other family members, go to school, work
at a job, and commute in traffic. Additionally, everyone eventually dies. Many people
experience painful deaths that are filled with intense suffering and a steady decline in
health, though death is bad even for those who do not experience a painful death. Once
people are brought into existence by being born, they usually have an interest in
continuing to exist; People usually have commitments and goals they want to accomplish
4

before their death and an ingrained fear of death. Death is bad because it goes against
people’s interest in continuing to exist and prevents them from achieving the goals they
have for their life (Benatar, 2006).
Benatar (2006) argues that the only way to prevent people from experiencing all
of this suffering and monotony is by them never being brought into existence. To Benatar
(2006), it is a good thing for people to miss out on all of the guaranteed misery that life
contains by not being born, this is because all suffering can be prevented by never being
born: Someone who is never brought into existence cannot suffer. In contrast, it is not
bad for people to miss out on the good things that life might contain for them by not
being born, as only existing people can be deprived of potential good things. Benatar
(2006) concludes that people should refrain from having children in order to prevent
those future children from suffering.
Another anti-natalist position is misanthropic anti-natalism, which is the view
that people should not have children because those children will cause suffering to
existing people (Benatar, 2015). Benatar has recently offered support for this
misanthropic view, though he states that this is only a conditional opposition to having
children and is contingent on other factors, such as the impending threat of
overpopulation or climate change (2015; 2019). If the threat of overpopulation or climate
change were resolved, the people who support this position would no longer have a
reason to be against people having children. This contrasts the altruistic form of antinatalism described above in which people oppose having children in order to prevent
children from suffering from the inevitable misery of existence.
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In contrast to Schopenhauer’s (1851) view that people continue to have children
as a consequence of sexual activity without much forethought for the potential child, one
of Benatar’s (2006) main arguments is that people continue to have children because of
an innate bias toward optimism. Benatar (2006) says that people largely see their lives as
being better than they actually are and expect their children’s lives to be similarly good,
so they view being born as a good thing. Without an innate optimism bias, people might
be less likely to reproduce (Benatar, 2006).
1.2 Optimism
Optimists are people who expect future events to turn out positively. Dispositional
optimism is measured in terms of outcome expectancies: To be high in optimism means
that a person has a positive view of their expected future life outcomes (Scheier &
Carver, 1985). Individuals high in optimism do not always hold this view for good
reasons; sometimes individuals are overly optimistic, and their future does not turn out as
positively as they expected it would. This brings us to optimism bias, which will be
discussed in detail next.
1.2.1 Optimism Bias
Research is largely in agreement with Benatar’s supposition that people are biased
toward optimism. The optimism bias (Sharot, 2011) is the commonly held belief that
someone’s future will be better than it is actually likely to be. An example of this is the
planning fallacy, which says that people have a tendency to be overly optimistic about
how little time it will take them to complete tasks (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 2002).
Additionally, people have a tendency to overestimate how likely they are to remain in
good health into old age and how long they will live, while they have a tendency to
6

underestimate how likely they are to experience bad events, like divorce (Sharot,
Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007; Sharot, 2011).
This optimism bias might provide some positive benefits for the individual. A
small bias toward optimism can encourage individuals to achieve goals that would be
advantageous if achieved, even when success at this goal is unlikely (Sharot et al., 2007).
Also, higher levels of optimism promote positive physical and mental well-being (Sharot
et al., 2007). Haselton & Nettle (2006) reasoned that it is better for people to have a
modest optimism bias, as opposed to seeing life realistically or holding a more
pessimistic view on life, as long as the cost of a false alarm for a positive event is low in
comparison to a false alarm for a negative event.
On the whole, research suggests that individuals benefit from seeing life more
optimistically than it actually is. However, Benatar (2006) argues that an optimism bias
might only be beneficial to the optimist, and instead harmful to their children who will be
condemned to existence because of this bias.
1.2.2 Manipulating Optimism
Optimism is an individual difference in personality: some people are
dispositionally higher in optimism, while others are lower (Scheier & Carver, 1985).
Accordingly, some individuals experience more or less of an optimism bias (Sharot,
Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007; Sharot, 2011).
Although optimism varies among individuals, it is not a stable personality trait.
For example, optimism increases throughout early and middle adulthood as people
succeed in their life goals before their amount of optimism plateaus somewhere around
55 to 70 years of age (Chopik, Kim, & Smith, 2015; Schwaba, Robins, Sanghavi, &
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Bleidorn, 2019). The thought with this research is that as most adults successfully
achieve life goals like getting married, having children, receiving a degree, and becoming
a part of the workforce, they think that they will continue to experience positive events in
the future. This changes later in life as people achieve most of these goals and retire,
therefore having less to look forward to in their future (Schwaba et al., 2019).
Can we determine if optimism causes individuals to reject anti-natalism, as
Benatar proposes? To examine if general optimism causes people to reject anti-natalism,
I employed an experimental design drawing on past research demonstrating that
optimism can be manipulated. Past research has changed optimism in several ways. The
most popular manipulation of optimism, the Best Possible Self (BPS) prime, was
developed by King (2001) and later adapted by Peters, Flink, Boersma, & Linton (2010).
In the King (2001) manipulation, participants were given a positive writing prompt about
their future each day for four days and were asked to spend 20 minutes writing about the
topic each time. In the adapted manipulation used by Peters et al. (2010), in a single day,
participants were given a positive essay topic about their future and were asked to spend
15 minutes writing about it and then 5 minutes imagining the story that they had just
written about their future. Both methods were found to effectively manipulate optimism.
Fosnaugh, Geers, & Wellman (2009) argued that shorter optimism manipulations
should be developed, they sought to develop a shorter manipulation that would
effectively manipulate optimism, they developed two methods that had similarly positive
results. Fosnaugh et al. (2009) gave participants a future-thinking manipulation where
participants were asked to think of positive future life events in a questionnaire that was
aimed at undergraduates, the questions were based on a questionnaire developed by
8

Weinstein (1980). Fosnaugh et al, (2009) gave another set of participants a 15-item
scrambled-sentence test with 11 words having to do with optimism. This second
manipulation was later used by Bosch-Meevissen, Peters, & Alberts (2014). The two
optimism manipulations developed by Fosnaugh and colleagues (2009) successfully
primed optimism. This success of shorter optimism manipulations suggests that optimism
can be manipulated in multiple manners, including using shorter writing tasks.
1.3 Nostalgia
To determine the unique impact of optimism on moral views of reproduction, I
compared its effects to a similarly positive view on time. In contrast to optimism,
nostalgia is defined as wanting to return to some positive event in a person’s past
(Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & Routledge, 2008; Baldwin, Biernat, & Landau, 2015). In
the past nostalgia was thought to negatively affect individuals and cause clinical
symptoms, such as depression, because nostalgia was thought to mean that a person was
homesick for some time in the past (Sedikides et al., 2008). More recently, nostalgia has
been found to provide individuals with a sense of meaning in life and increased selfesteem and positive affect (Sedikides et al., 2008; Cheung, Wildschut, Sedikides, Hepper,
Arndt, & Vingerhoets, 2013). Additionally, nostalgia increases individuals’ amount of
optimism: This is thought to be because both nostalgia and optimism are related to
increased self-esteem (Cheung et al., 2013).
1.3.1 Nostalgia Priming
In order to see if positive thoughts of the past have different implications for antinatalism than positive thoughts of the future, nostalgia needs to also be manipulated.
Nostalgia has been primed by researchers in several ways. Some researchers (Cheung et
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al., 2013; Baldwin, Biernat, & Landau, 2015) asked participants to think of a nostalgic
memory from their past and to write about it in detail for a few minutes or however long
the participant felt was sufficient. Cheung et al. (2013) also used music as a way to prime
nostalgia. In one study participants were asked to listen to a nostalgic song, and in
another study, participants were asked to first name a song that they thought was
nostalgic and then later read the lyrics of the song that they had named (Cheung et al.,
2013). These past nostalgia manipulations show that nostalgia is manipulatable and can
be primed in a number of ways.
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CHAPTER II – THE CURRENT STUDY
To date, research has not been published on anti-natalism as a moral position;
Nevertheless, I believe it offers considerable potential as a new area of psychology.
Accordingly, research has not looked at who holds or rejects anti-natalist positions and
why they feel the way they do about anti-natalism. The purpose of the current study was
to conduct psychological research on anti-natalism as a moral position. I am particularly
interested in the effect of peoples’ levels of optimism on positions for or against antinatalism. As noted above, the personality factor I examined in the current study is
optimism. I hypothesized that individuals in the optimism condition would be lower in
anti-natalism compared to individuals in the control group and that individuals in the
nostalgia condition will be similar to the control group or at least higher in anti-natalism
than the optimism group, as nostalgia has been shown to increase optimism (Cheung et
al., 2013).
I focused on optimism because of Benatar’s (2006) supposition that people
continue to have children irrespective of how bad life is because they have an innate bias
toward optimism. While not specifically getting at whether individuals’ level of optimism
is misguided or not this research will look at the effect of state optimism on anti-natalism.
Additionally, some currently unpublished correlational data I have collected shows that
people higher in optimism are lower in both misanthropic r = -.16, p =.005 and altruistic r
= -.20, p <.001 anti-natalism (Brown & Keefer, in prep). With this current study, I
wanted to see if priming people to be more optimistic would further decrease their
support for anti-natalism.
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In the present study, I tested the hypothesis that optimism motivates individuals to
reject anti-natalist positions. In order to test this, I manipulated optimism, nostalgia, or
gave participants a neutral/control topic. As noted above, nostalgia allowed me to see if
optimism is exclusively important to reduced levels of anti-natalism, or if positive
thoughts in general are important to lowered amounts of anti-natalism. Additionally, as
nostalgia has been shown to increase optimism (Cheung et al., 2013), it could be that
nostalgia also decreases support for anti-natalism (compared to control) by raising
optimism. The control group was meant to serve as a baseline for support for antinatalism. If positive thoughts of the future are exclusively important in palliating people’s
support for reproduction, then nostalgia priming should either not show a difference from
the control or not show as much of a difference as optimism.
As I developed a novel optimism and nostalgia prime for the current study, it is
important to remember that priming is not always successful. Primes sometimes do not
work as intended for a variety of reasons. For example, primes might not have a direct
effect on the participant (Loersch & Payne, 2011). Additionally, priming effects might
not be found in all participants and under every circumstance (Cesario, 2014). As such, it
could be that my prime might not influence my sample but may be effective with another
sample.
In order to assess potential indirect effects of the manipulation on support for antinatalism, the study included several candidate mediators. These included brief measures
of global optimism, optimism about one’s future children, and state self-esteem
(described below). Exploratory analysis tested whether condition effects on the outcomes
may be due to changes in optimism or self-perceptions.
12

CHAPTER III – METHOD
3.1 Participants
Based on a power analysis using the software G*power, I sought to recruit 144
participants through the online participant pool SONA at the University of Southern
Mississippi. My power analysis was based on my plan to test my hypothesis using a 3 x 2
mixed-model ANOVA two-tailed test with a power of .80 and a predicted medium effect
size (f =.25). I chose to oversample in order to remove any participants who missed one
of the two attention checks from analysis. Data was collected from 159 participants, with
141 not failing an attention check and thus being included in the analysis. Of the 141
participants 118 were female, 22 were male, and one did not identify as male, female, or
transgender. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 46 with a mean age of 20. The sample
was ethnically diverse. 70 identified as white/Caucasian, 56 as black/African American,
seven as Latino(a) or Hispanic, three as Asian/Pacific Islander, and five as multiracial.
Additionally, most participants wanted children in the future but did not yet have them.
Seven participants had children, while 134 did not. And 118 reported desiring them in the
future, 15 were unsure if they wanted children, five did not want children, and three had
children and did not want anymore. Given the relatively small representation of these
categories, we did not use these variables in the analysis but report them for the sake of
completeness.
3.2 Materials
3.2.1 Demographics Questionnaire
Participants received a demographics questionnaire asking them their age, sex,
religious and ethnic background, if they have children, and the number of children they
13

want to have in the future. I did not expect to find a difference in sex, age, or ethnic
background, but it is standard practice to report these data. I did not expect to have
enough variability to find religious differences, though I included religious affiliation for
exploratory purposes in case there was enough variability to test for differences. Past data
suggest denominational differences in anti-natalism (Brown & Keefer, in prep), but I was
unsure if I would find sufficiently large group sizes to detect differences in parental goals
or ethical opinions. In the final sample, religious categories were largely weighted toward
Baptist, (48% Baptist, 16% Christian other, 11% Catholic, 6% Methodist, 6% nonreligious, 5% agnostic, 3% Presbyterian, all other religions <1%). As a result, I decided
against testing differences between specific categories.
3.2.2 Priming Material
In order to manipulate optimism and nostalgia, I developed an essay response task
based off of the King (2001) optimism manipulation and Cheung and colleagues (2013)
nostalgia manipulation. For my study, I developed three essay topics representing
optimism (Figure 2), nostalgia (Figure 3), or a neutral control (Figure 1). Participants
were randomly assigned to complete one of these prompts. Participants had to spend a
minimum of five minutes thinking about the topic and then typing out reflections on a
positive future event (optimism), a positive past event (nostalgia), or an average day in
their lives (control). I used this novel essay task for each condition in order to standardize
the types of manipulations for optimism and nostalgia so that the primes would be
comparable and to prevent disparity in the amount of time it would take to complete the
primes.
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3.2.3 Manipulation Checks
I checked that the manipulations worked as intended by including a manipulation
check on both optimism and nostalgia. To perform a manipulation check on the optimism
prime, I gave participants the Life Orientation Test-Revised (Figure 4), which is the most
commonly used measure of optimism (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). To assess
nostalgia, I gave participants three previously validated items asking them how nostalgic
they felt (Figure 5) (Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, Routledge, 2008; Cheung et al., 2013).
As optimism and nostalgia have been shown to be related and nostalgia has been shown
to increase optimism (Cheung et al., 2013), I gave each group both manipulation checks
in randomized order. Reliabilities and descriptive statistics for these and all subsequent
scales are presented in Table 2.
3.2.4 Self-Esteem Measure
Because both optimism and nostalgia have been found to be related to positive
self-esteem (Cheung et al., 2013), I then measured state self-esteem using the State SelfEsteem Scale (Figure 6) (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Composite State Self-Esteem
scores were calculated to measure global self-esteem at that present moment. The scale
proved to be highly reliable and scores were averaged across all items.
3.2.5 Better Than Average Children Beliefs
In order to examine if feeling that one’s children or future children are better than
the children or future children of other people participants were asked three questions
about how good and successful their children are (or will be) compared to other children
(Figure 7). This ad hoc measure also provided high reliability and scores were averaged
across the items.
15

3.2.6 Essay Responses
To gauge individuals’ feelings on anti-natalism and anti-natalists I developed two
essays. One essay is a shortened version of (Benatar, 1997), which argues that it is
immoral for humans to reproduce (Figure 8). Another is a shortened version of (Spera,
2005) a paper arguing in support of more parental involvement in education (Figure 9). I
have used perceptions of both edited essays in past research to indirectly assess views on
anti-natalism (Brown & Keefer, in prep). These two essays were given to participants in
random order to measure individuals’ feelings on anti-natalism and a parental essay that
is not directly pro-natalist. For both essays, participants were asked how friendly,
responsible, ethical, kind, and fulfilled in life they felt the author was (Figure 10).
Participants were also asked to assign a grade for the essay out of 100 (Figure 11).
Participants were asked to both answer questions about the authors of the essays they
received and grade the essays in order to gauge their feelings on the essays and on the
authors of the essays. Another reason to include the essays in the study was to compare
individuals’ ratings on the essays to their responses to the anti-natalism scale that is to
follow. As the anti-natalism scale is a relatively new scale that has currently been used in
only two studies (Brown & Keefer, in prep), the use of the essays helps to further validate
the scale. If the scale is measuring anti-natalism, then individuals’ ratings on the scale
should closely match how negatively or positively individuals feel about the edited
version of Benatar’s original article on anti-natalism (1997).
3.2.7 Anti-Natalism Scale
In the study, I measured people’s level of anti-natalism using the scale. I created
measuring individuals’ support for anti-natalism (Brown & Keefer, in prep). The scale
16

measures anti-natalism in general (Figure 12), altruistic anti-natalism (Figure 13), and
misanthropic anti-natalism (Figure 14). All three subscales yielded extremely high
reliabilities and scores were averaged for each.
3.3 Procedure
Participants were recruited through SONA, they then set up a time to take the
study in lab, once they came into the lab they were given an informed consent statement
and asked to read over and sign it if they chose to participate. Consenting participants
completed the study on a lab computer. They filled out the demographics questionnaire,
were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (optimism vs. nostalgia vs.
control). Next, they took the two manipulation checks in randomized order to confirm
that my manipulations worked as planned, then the state self-esteem and child perception
measures. Then they were given two essays in randomized order and asked to rate and
grade the authors. Finally, they completed the anti-natalism scale and debriefing.
3.4 Analysis
I used a 3 (between-subjects: optimism vs. nostalgia vs. control) x 2 (repeated
measure: anti-natalism vs. control) mixed-model ANOVA to test for mean level
differences between my primes and peoples’ opinions of the essays; Scores on the antinatalism scale dimensions were tested with a series of one-way ANOVAs by prime
condition. These ANOVA models were run both as ANOVAs and again as ANCOVAs
controlling for baseline variation in self-esteem.
In addition to testing effects on each specific outcome, and assuming sufficient
overlap in essay ratings and scale scores, I analyzed an omnibus anti-natalism score taken
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by averaging participants’ (standardized) ratings on the essays, grading of the essays, and
scores on the anti-natalism scale in order to look at a composite anti-natalism average.
The multifaceted scale measuring anti-natalism also allowed for exploratory
analysis of potential boundary conditions for optimism effects; For instance, it might
have been that optimism decreased altruistic, but not misanthropic anti-natalism.
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CHAPTER IV – RESULTS
4.1 Manipulation Checks
I first ran an ANOVA by priming condition on the manipulation check measures
of optimism and nostalgia. Using the Life Orientation Test-Revised to check that my
optimism manipulation was successful, the prime did not significantly alter global
optimism (see Table 1 for all means and test statistics). In contrast, the nostalgia
manipulation significantly increased nostalgia.
4.2 Essay Ratings/Grades
I then submitted essay ratings to a 3 (condition; between-subjects) × 2 (essay;
within-subjects) mixed-model ANOVA which indicated a significant interaction, F(2,
138) = 3.98, p = .021, ηp 2 = .06. To decompose this interaction, I tested the effects of
condition for each essay separately. There was a significant effect on the rating of the
anti-natalist article (see Table 1); participants in the nostalgia condition rated the antinatalism article significantly lower than those in the control condition. The anti-natalism
article ratings in the optimism condition were not significantly different from the control
condition. Additionally, anti-natalism article ratings did not significantly differ between
optimism and nostalgia. As expected, there was not a significant effect on the control
essay rating.
To determine whether results were explained by state self-esteem in response to
the manipulation, I then submitted essay ratings to a 3 (condition) x 2 (essay) mixed
model ANCOVA controlling for self-esteem. The interaction did not change from the
original ANOVA, F(2,137) = 3.94, p = .022, ηp 2 = .05. There was no effect of state selfesteem on essay ratings (p = .48).
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Submitting essay grades to the same 3 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA returned only a
main effect of essay [F(2, 134) = 148.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .53], indicating that participants
overwhelmingly gave higher scores to the control essay as compared to the anti-natalist
essay. The interaction was not significant [F(2, 134) = 1.91, p = .15]. There were no main
effects of condition on the grades for either essay (Table 1). Nevertheless, pairwise t-tests
did indicate that participants in the nostalgia condition graded the anti-natalist essay as
worse than participants in the control condition (p = .04), matching the pattern we saw in
essay ratings (Table 1). As expected, there was not a significant difference in the control
essay grading. Controlling for State Self-Esteem did not change the pattern of the
interaction between condition and essay type [F(2, 133) = 1.99, p = .14] and self-esteem
had no effect (p = .45).
4.3 Anti-Natalism Scale
One-way ANOVAs on the three scale components (anti-natalism in general,
altruistic anti-natalism, and misanthropic anti-natalism) were all non-significant (Table
1).
Correlations between the measures of anti-natalism and our supplemental
measures indicated several notable associations (see Table 2). Unsurprisingly, the grading
and rating of the anti-natalism essay was found to have a strong positive correlation. The
anti-natalism essay rating and responses to the altruistic anti-natalism scale components
were significantly positively correlated. General anti-natalism was significantly
positively correlated with both misanthropic and altruistic anti-natalism. And
misanthropic and altruistic anti-natalism were positively correlated with each other. In
summary, the anti-natalism measures showed some degree of overlap, although many
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associations (e.g., between essay grades and scale scores) were non-significant.
Nevertheless, I then standardized the anti-natalism variables as planned and looked at the
composite anti-natalism score (ɑ = .63). The effect of condition on the composite antinatalism score was not significant, F(2,137) = 1.15, p = .32.
4.4 Better-than-Average Children
I then analyzed better-than-average beliefs about future children. There was a
main effect of condition on optimism about future children. The differences between both
optimism and nostalgia and control were significant, and these two priming conditions
did not differ (Table 1).
Although the optimism condition did not have a direct effect on my outcomes, it
is possible that it had indirect effects on essay evaluations through these specific
optimistic perceptions about future offspring. As noted in Table 2, there was a small
negative correlation between perceptions of the superiority of one’s future offspring and
ratings of the anti-natalist essay (r = -.21).
To conduct an exploratory test of these indirect effects, I then examined if
positive perceptions of future children might mediate the relationship between condition
and anti-natalism scores. The mediation models found weak evidence for a mediated
effect of the optimism condition on anti-natalism essay ratings through better than
average thoughts about children, indirect effect of optimism: -.11; 95% CI with 5000
resamples = (-.30, .01), p = .052. There was, however, evidence that the observed effect
of nostalgia condition on the essay ratings was at least partially explained by optimism
about one’s future offspring: indirect effect = -.12; 95% CI with 5000 resamples = (-.31, .01), p = .046.
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Additionally, these better than average beliefs about future children were
negatively related to anti-natalism in general, misanthropic anti-natalism, altruistic antinatalism, and the anti-natalism article rating. These findings generally support Benatar’s
thesis that optimism about future offspring in part explains why people are resistant
toward anti-natalism.
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CHAPTER V – GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this paper was to examine if an optimism manipulation would
influence people to reject anti-natalism. Benatar (2006) proposes that one of the main
reasons individuals continue to reproduce even though life is filled with suffering is
because of an evolutionarily adaptive optimism bias. Prior research supports the idea that
people are likely to possess some degree of optimism bias. As such, the goal of this
study, while not directly assessing an optimism bias, was to offer a first examination of
Benatar’s thesis that optimism inoculates individuals from anti-natalism.
To clarify whether any effects of this manipulation were specific to optimism or
whether positive thoughts about time in general would influence people to further reject
anti-natalism, I also manipulated positive thoughts about the past. As such, I sought to
test whether optimism exclusively causes people to reject anti-natalism more or if
nostalgia would also cause people to reject anti-natalism.
Interestingly, individuals primed with nostalgia were lower in support for antinatalism (as measured by essay evaluations) compared to individuals in the optimism or
control conditions. It is difficult to say whether the lack of an effect of optimism was due
to the weakness of the manipulation; After all, it did not influence scores on my global
optimism manipulation check. These data suggest that recalling positive experiences
from one’s own childhood (my participants were overwhelmingly young adults), may
cause people to be more resistant to a moral stance that opposes reproduction.
Nevertheless, both the optimism and nostalgia conditions did increase specific
optimism about future offspring. While optimism in general (as assessed by the LOT-R)
was not shown to have a direct relationship with most measures of anti-natalism,
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individuals higher in optimism about future offspring supported anti-natalism less. This
more specific form of optimism partially explained the effects of the nostalgia priming
condition on anti-natalism essay ratings.
Additionally, there was marginal (p = .052) evidence that the optimism condition
did lower ratings of the anti-natalism essay in part through changes in these specific
perceptions of future offspring. It is possible that the optimism condition did not show a
main effect because this indirect effect was eliminated by other unobserved processes;
For example, optimism priming may have increased optimism about future children
(thereby lowering support for anti-natalism) but also increased expectations about one’s
career prospects (increasing support for anti-natalism) or some other unobserved
variables. Nevertheless, this indirect effect of optimism condition on the outcome lacked
a direct effect and is marginal and should therefore be interpreted cautiously.
5.1 Limitations
A potential limitation for this study is the general lack of support for antinatalism; For example, average scores of the self-report scales were less than 2 on a 7point response scale (Table 2). While I did find significant differences in support for antinatalism on the essay ratings, support for anti-natalism remained low. In general,
individuals were not likely to rate the anti-natalism essay positively or support the
statements in the anti-natalism scale. Most people eventually reproduce and while it is
growing in popularity, anti-natalism remains an unpopular opinion. As such, it is
uncertain if a more appropriate anti-natalist sample would have responded differently to
the study design.

24

A related concern is the undergraduate sample. All of the participants for the
study were college students around the age of 20. As my sample was young and in the
process of pursuing a degree, they might not think much about having children and the
ethics of reproduction. Almost the entire sample either wanted children or were
undecided and most did not yet have children. Results might be different for an older
sample who might be actively thinking of reproducing or have children already.
As noted, the partial reliance on direct self-report may have restricted range
somewhat dramatically in the analysis. Given the significant effect of condition on
ratings of the anti-natalist essay, the clear implication is that future studies should rely on
other more indirect measures of support for (and resistance to) anti-natalist beliefs.
5.2 Future Research
This study offers several possibilities for future research. Future studies might
consider different optimism measures and manipulations. As noted, the manipulation
check used in this study (the LOT-R, a standard optimism measure) was not affected by
the manipulation. This could be because the manipulation was not strong enough to prime
participants for optimism, or this could be because the LOT-R is a trait measure of
optimism that may not be sensitive to state variation. Past studies have typically used the
LOT-R to measure optimism post-manipulation (Fosnaugh et al. 2009; Schwaba et al.,
2019). As such, I chose to use the LOT-R as a manipulation check in my study, although
perhaps a more appropriate state measure of optimism should be developed to improve
this kind of experimental research. Future research should use different manipulations
and optimism measures in order to determine the specific effect of optimism priming on
anti-natalist beliefs.
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Additionally, future studies could look at anti-natalism with a more diverse
sample. As most of the sample for the present study was young, childless, and eventually
desiring children it is uncertain how older adults or adults with more diverse parental
goals would react to anti-natalism. Future research with more parents and childless-bychoice individuals would offer the possibility to run exploratory analyses looking at the
potential that parental status and desire for children might influence peoples’ support or
rejection of anti-natalism. For example, parents and people desiring to become parents
would not be expected to support anti-natalism because doing so would be inconsistent
with their actions and desires and people are motivated to hold beliefs consistent with
their behavior (Matz & Hinsz, 2003; Koestner, Bernieri, & Zuckerman, 1992).
On the same token, future research could examine the effect of optimism
manipulation on anti-natalism in a more anti-natalist sample. A more anti-natalist sample
would be expected to be higher in support on the anti-natalism scale items compared to
the general population, which from this study remained low regardless of condition.
Additionally, while a more anti-natalist sample might be higher on some components of
the anti-natalism scale, they may show greater sensitivity to different anti-natalism
positions. For example, some might be high in altruistic anti-natalism because they
support anti-natalism to prevent future people from suffering by being born, others might
be high in misanthropic anti-natalism because they want to prevent current people from
suffering from the ill effects of new people being born, and others might be high in both
because they support multiple justifications for anti-natalism. A more anti-natalist sample
should also be much higher in support for anti-natalism on both the essay questions as
they should support anti-natalism in general. Also, an anti-natalist sample might be more
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resistant to optimism priming than an undergraduate sample as, going along with
Benatar’s (2006) previously mentioned supposition, they are expected to be less likely to
have an optimism bias and be optimistic about their future and the future of potential
offspring.
Furthermore, the present study does not directly test the specific possibility that
an optimism bias influences rejection of anti-natalism. The present study instead offered
a first look at optimism as a potential cause of rejection of anti-natalism. As such, future
research should use past optimism bias measures (e.g., Dejoy, 1989; Weinstein, 1980) to
measure peoples’ tendency toward optimism and their rejection (or support) of antinatalism. Additionally, future research could manipulate peoples’ optimism bias by
telling them that their lives or their children’s lives will be better than their lives are
likely to be on average and then measure their support (or rejection) of anti-natalism. If
Benatar’s (2006) thesis if correct, then overly optimistic people and people primed for an
optimism bias should report less endorsement of anti-natalism even when faced with the
potential harsh realities future children will face.
5.3 Conclusion
Building on Benatar’s (2006) argument, I tested whether an optimism
manipulation would decrease anti-natalism, but this prediction was not directly
supported. Instead nostalgia directly reduced anti-natalism, while optimism did not.
Additionally, though overall optimism was not linked to reduced support for antinatalism, optimism about future children specifically was linked to less support for antinatalism. These findings suggest that though optimism in general might not inoculate
people from supporting anti-natalism, more focused optimism about one’s children might
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lead to a rejection of anti-natalism. There was evidence that both optimism and nostalgia
priming increased this specific optimism about future children and, indirectly, lowered
support for anti-natalism. The finding that people who are optimistic about future
children are lower in anti-natalism corresponds to Benatar’s supposition that thinking
future children will have a good life leads people to reject anti-natalism.
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APPENDIX A - Tables
Table 1. Condition
Optimism

Nostalgia

Control

Optimism

3.42 (.66) a

3.48 (.72) a

3.60 (.77) a

F(2,138) = .82, p = .44, ηp2 =.01

Nostalgia

3.27 (1.79) a

5.16 (1.99) b

3.16 (1.55) a

F(2,138) = 18.31, p < .001, ηp2 =.21

State SE

3.3 (.72) a

3.5 (.74) a

3.6 (.69) a

F(2,138) = 2.12, p = .12, ηp2 = .03

BTA Children

5.23 (.93) a

5.27 (1.03) a

4.78 (1.09) b

F(2,138) = 3.32, p = .039, ηp2 = .05

AN Essay

2.73 (1.27) a

2.32 (1.20) b

3.05 (1.45) a

F(2, 138) = 3.57, p = .03, ηp2 = .05

AN Grade

78.23 (12.86) ab

75.22 (13.76) b

80.84 (12.55) a

F(2, 134) = 2.06, p = .13, ηp2 = .03

Control Essay

5.72 (.85) a

5.93 (.79) a

5.75 (.86) a

F(2, 138) = .85, p = .43, ηp2 = .01

Control Grade

92.47 (5.85) a

92.27 (6.67) a

92.35 (5.52) a

F(2,137) = .014, p =.99, ηp2 < .001

General AN

1.28 (.67) a

1.37 (.74) a

1.22 (.49) a

F(2,138) = .68, p = .51, ηp2 = .01

Altruistic AN

1.82 (.99) a

1.94 (.86) a

2.18 (1.08) a

F(2,138) = 1.54, p = .22, ηp2 = .02

Misanthropic AN

2.03 (1.24) a

1.85 (.94) a

1.88 (1.00) a

F(2,138) = .42, p = .66, ηp2 = .006

Note. Means with different superscripts differ at p < .05.
Means and standard deviations of all variables by condition

Table 2. Observed correlations between all variables.

1. Optimism

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

-

-.20*

.47***

.14†

-0.1

-0.08

0.1

0.12

-0.04

-.15†

-0.1

-

-.27**

0.007

-0.07

-0.01

0.08

0.07

.15†

-0.04

-0.02

-

0.08

-0.004

-0.04

-0.08

0.04

-0.009

-0.07

-0.04

-

-.21**

-0.11

.21*

.15†

-.21*

-.21*

-.15†

-

.54***

-0.05

0.03

0.07

.23**

0.1

-

-.15†

0.13

0.01

0.12

0.09

-0.08

-.27**

-0.12

-0.08

2. Nostalgia
3. State SE
4. BTA Children
5. AN Essay
6. AN Grade
7. Control Essay

-

8. Control Grade

.49*** -.24**
-

9. General AN

-.27**
-

10. Altruistic AN

.37*** .55***
-

11. Misanthropic AN
α

M (SD)

.42***
-

0.78

0.98

0.92

0.84

0.89

NA

0.85

NA

0.82

0.69

0.83

3.50

3.83

3.46

5.09

2.71

78.08

5.80

92.36

1.29

1.98

1.92

(.72)

(2.00)

(.72)

(1.04)

(1.34)

(13.17)

(.84)

(5.98)

(.64)

(.99)

(1.07)

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001

APPENDIX B – Figures

Figure 1: Control Task

Figure 2: Optimism Task
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Figure 3: Nostalgia Task
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Figure 4: LOT-R

Figure 5: Nostalgia Manipulation Check
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Figure 6: State Self-Esteem Scale
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Figure 7: Better-Than-Average Children Questions

Figure 8: Anti-Natalism Essay
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Figure 9: Parenting Essay

Figure 10: Questions for each essay
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Figure 11: Grading scale for each essay

Figure 12: General Anti-Natalism Scale Questions
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Figure 13: Altruistic Anti-Natalism Scale Questions
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Figure 14: Misanthropic Anti-Natalism Scale Questions
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